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Abstract 
The coal business unit of Teck will move over 300 million bank cubic metres of material 
or approximately 800 million tonnes in 2015 using a fleet of large haul trucks and shovels.  The 
mining and maintenance costs alone to move this material will be approximately $1.3 billion.  
The cost of loading and hauling the material will be approximately half that cost and represents 
the single largest cost of producing steelmaking coal.  This thesis will focus on truck/shovel 
productivity in the coal business unit of Teck as this represents one of the most significant areas 
of opportunity for cost reduction.  A 10% improvement in truck/shovel productivity could yield a 
return approaching $100 million.  I have identified significant gaps in the relative performance 
between the operations and identified the operation that consistently demonstrates the highest 
performance.  That performance is a result of both a high level of operating standards as well as a 
culture that has long embraced productivity as a core value.  I am proposing that Teck consolidate 
and expand on the work done to identify best practice in truck/shovel productivity at the 
Greenhills operation.  Further, I am proposing that we leverage the process used in developing a 
culture of safety in Teck to develop a framework for developing a culture of productivity across 
both the coal business unit and Teck as a company. 
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1: Introduction 
Teck is a diversified resource company committed to responsible mining and mineral 
development. Headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, Teck is the second largest seaborne exporter 
of steelmaking coal, a top ten copper producer in the Americas and the third largest producer of 
zinc concentrate.  Teck’s steelmaking coal operations are all located in Western Canada with five 
operations concentrated in the Southeast British Columbia and one in Northwest Alberta.  These 
six operations combined move approximately 300 million bank cubic metres of material to 
produce approximately 27 million tonnes of steelmaking coal per year.  This material is moved 
using large-scale mining equipment; predominately haul trucks ranging from 218 tonnes to the 
largest available class, 363 tonnes. 
Teck competes in a world commodity market for steelmaking coal.  This market is cyclic 
in that the supply demand balance can and has shifted from periods of strong demand with limited 
supply (i.e. high margin period) to weak demand with excessive supply (i.e. low margin period).  
The aim of Teck is to maximize the profit associated with their long life steelmaking coal 
reserves independent of the market cycle they find themselves in.  The problem Teck faces is that 
operating strategies can vary significantly depending on the nature of the cycle at any given time 
and to move from one strategy to another is often challenging. 
Teck is currently in the most significant downturn the industry has faced in the last 15 
years.  This has developed much quicker than anyone anticipated after what was the most 
profitable period the industry had seen since the late 1970s.  The problem Teck faces is the rapid 
expansion of steelmaking coal capacity globally during the high margin period has now lead to a 
massive oversupply and consequently the industry now finds itself in a very challenging market 
characterized by low pricing on all qualities of steelmaking coal.   
To compete in this over supplied and highly competitive market, Teck must now produce 
coal at the lowest possible cost.  The majority of costs required to produce a marketable product 
are associated with the mining phase of the operations; specifically, the truck and shovel process.  
During the high margin cycle from 2003 to 2012, Teck made significant investments in its coal 
business unit, predominately in the truck and shovel category; larger class truck fleets and larger 
shovels were purchased at several operations.  The process plants were also upgraded and 
expanded and the business unit was preparing for what was believed to be a longer term strong 
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market cycle for steelmaking coal.  This rapid expansion of capacity of the entire industry has 
created both a problem and an opportunity now for Teck.   
The problem is that the productivity of the truck/shovel mining activity has declined from 
historical levels despite the advantage that larger, newer equipment should give the operations.  
This is arguably an unintended consequence of the drive to increase absolute production to 
maximize profit by delivering as much coal to market as possible.  In this operating strategy, 
productivity is a secondary consideration to production since the value of the extra tonne of coal 
produced outweighs the cost of getting that tonne of coal; consequently, productivity tends to fall 
as a natural outcome of the strategy.   
Exasperating the shift in focus away from productivity has been the high turnover of 
experienced operators and supervisors to the oil sands in northern Alberta.  The high price oil and 
the rapid expansion of that industry has attracted many of our most talented employees and 
consequently, we have lost much of the experience that lead to high historical productivities. 
The opportunity now is that Teck has invested in operating assets that are not being 
utilized as productively as they could be.  In a low margin period, this gap between the current 
operating performance and the theoretical operating performance means that Teck can be 
producing its product at a much lower net cost.  This allows Teck the opportunity to become more 
competitive in what has become a highly competitive market.  In other words, the last tonne of 
coal produced can no longer be considered independent of all the other production as there is 
limited capacity for the market to absorb the available world supply of steelmaking coal.  There is 
only so much coal the market can absorb and every tonne of coal must now be produced at the 
lowest possible cost to maximize the margin available.   
With this background, the remainder of my thesis is structured as follows: 
In Chapter 2 I examine the nature of the market in steelmaking coal, reflecting back on 
the historical cycles and the impact on Teck’s coal business unit.  This is critical context to 
building an understanding of what the risk of failure is to the organization and it will be an 
integral part of a strategy to engage employees in a mission to improve productivity.  
In Chapter 3 I present an industry analysis of the steelmaking coal industry with the 
purpose of identifying the correct operating strategy for this current market cycle and supporting 
the case for a focus on productivity.  This analysis represents the technical “proof” for this 
strategy and will be important in establishing future context for the next series of cycles. 
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In Chapter 4 I outline the response Teck should take to the current market cycle.  I will 
identify the potential gap between the operations in key operating metrics.  This chapter will also 
identify the key drivers behind truck shovel productivity and propose an implementation plan for 
closing the gap across the business unit. 
In Chapter 5 I outline an implementation plan based on the work of John P. Kotter on 
transformational change and on the strategy developed in Teck to create a culture of safety.  I 
strongly believe that as with safety, productivity is as much about culture as it is about the 
technical skills.  Knowing how to do something is only effective if people actually believe it is 
important.  Leadership and commitment will be critical to the success of this strategy and 
leveraging our experience with culture change will be an important aspect of the project. 
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2: The nature of Pricing Cycles in the Steelmaking Coal 
Industry  
I am going to explain in this chapter the nature of the cycles that occurred between the 
70s and current era and the opportunities these cycles create for Teck.  Understanding the nature 
of these cycles is critical to understanding the operating strategies that Teck must adopt to 
compete in the steelmaking coal industry.  It is only by applying the correct operating strategy as 
quickly as possible that Teck will be able to achieve its objective of maximizing the value of the 
Coal business unit to the organization.  
2.1 The first major pricing cycle in the modern steelmaking coal 
industry 
There have been two major historical cycles in the steel industry, driven by world 
economic conditions that have led to significant structural change in the steelmaking coal 
industry.  The first cycle followed a very distinct pattern that generally consisted of three phases.  
 The first phase was one of rapid growth in the steel industry, which led to strong demand 
for steelmaking coal; I will call this the demand phase.  Through the first half of the 70s, world 
economies were expanding and we saw Japan and Korea rapidly advance their steel industry in 
response.  They required steelmaking coal from around the world to fuel this growth in steel and 
they looked to Canada and Australia for new supply.  The opportunity for the steelmaking coal 
industry was significant and in Canada, projects were advanced in Southeast British Columbia as 
these new markets opened up.  Further development occurred in Northeast British Columbia 
spurred by direct investment from the Japanese steel industry.  The same dynamics existed in 
Australia and their steelmaking coal industry was also rapidly expanding.  In this phase, the 
steelmaking coal industry had the opportunity for exceptional returns if they could develop their 
reserves quickly; therefore, the cost of developing and operating the mines were secondary to the 
value created by production capacity. 
The second phase occurred when the steel industry rate of growth levelled off trapping 
the steelmaking coal industry with more developed supply than the steel industry could consume; 
I will call this the over-supply phase.  The problem for the steelmaking coal industry is it takes a 
considerable amount of time and resources to develop the projects.  The other problem is that the 
demand projections are extremely difficult to predict given the complexity of world economies.  
These two factors ultimately lead to a massive over supply that took shape in the late 70s to early 
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80s.  The steelmaking coal industry now had to respond to the collapse of pricing for its product 
in the face of massive capital investment in the infrastructure established through the demand 
phase.  The outcome was a consolidation of the steelmaking coal industry and a drive to reduce 
operating costs to keep the remaining supply competitive.  The first and second phases are 
illustrated in figure 2-1. 
Figure 2-1: Demand and Oversupply stages of First Major Pricing Cycle 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by author, data from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
 
The opportunity for the steelmaking coal industry was they could still generate 
reasonable margins if they could reduce their costs from the base they had created in the demand 
phase.  Because of the inefficiencies associated with the push to maximize production at all costs, 
most companies were still able to make significant margins in the early stages of phase 2. 
  The third phase was essentially the period of rebalancing that followed the over-supply 
phase as the industry came to terms with the market it created; I will call this the survival phase.  
In this phase, operating efficiency and productivity were critical to the success and sometimes 
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survival of companies in the steelmaking coal industry.  Margins were very narrow and it was 
only the most productive mines that were able to produce returns from their assets.  The problem 
with this phase is that no one knew how long it would last and because of the low returns and 
uncertain future, there was very little investment made in the operating assets.  The opportunity 
lay in a view that the companies that could survive this stage would eventually enjoy a resurgence 
of demand for steelmaking coal.  Unfortunately, this phase lasted approximately 16 years as 
illustrated in figure 2-2. 
Figure 2-2: Survival Phase of First Major Pricing Cycle 
 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by author, data from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
 
The survival phase from the late 80s to early 2000s is the particular focus of my thesis.  I 
believe that during the consolidation period of the early 90s and the subsequent single-minded 
focus on productivity for over a decade, some operations in Southeast British Columbia (the Elk 
Valley) established a level of productivity that was arguably the highest in the industry.  In 
particular, the Greenhills mine stood out.  This operation had actually gone through a bankruptcy 
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and closure in 1991.  Fording Coal acquired the assets and restarted the mine in 1992.  Fording 
invested in new, more productive mining equipment and hired back the best operators from the 
previous workforce.  With new equipment and an opportunity to bring Greenhills back to a 
competitive position in the market, the employees at Greenhills embraced an operating strategy of 
achieving the highest possible productivity at the lowest possible costs.  Not only did they set a 
standard for operating practice but they developed a culture of productivity that still exists today.  
Summarizing the first cycle, there were three phases characterized by strong demand, 
oversupply and survival.  The strong demand phase led to a strategy of rapid growth in the 
steelmaking coal industry.  The subsequent oversupply phase led to consolidation in the 
steelmaking coal industry as companies attempted to remain competitive.  The strategy during 
this phase was to remain competitive while retaining the capacity to meet a change in demand.  
The final survival stage occurred when the industry came to terms with the reality that demand 
was not going to increase in a predictable way and their strategy would have to be a focus on 
productivity to remain competitive in a low margin environment.  Many companies failed to 
improve their competitive position through productivity and cost control and instead fell back on 
short term strategies like reducing strip ratio and haul distance at the expense of long-term 
viability.  Ultimately, these strategies lead to significant consolidation in the industry as 
companies went bankrupt and often what could have been economic reserves were no longer 
viable without significant investment. 
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2.2 The second major pricing cycle in the modern steelmaking coal 
industry 
The second major cycle began in the early 2000s.  As illustrated in figure 2-3, the cycle 
began very much as the first major cycle.   
Figure 2-3: Demand and Oversupply Phase of Second Major Pricing Cycle 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by author, data from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
Expanding world economies and the emergence of China drove rapid growth in the steel 
industry at the front end of the cycle.  One difference in this second cycle was the supply 
interruption during the demand phase that occurred when there were massive floods in Australia.  
These created spikes in pricing that further drove the development of capacity in the steelmaking 
coal industry.  Capacity in Australia, Canada and the United States increased in response to 
demand; new capacity began to develop in regions of the world like Mozambique, and Russia 
previously thought to be uneconomic.   
As with the first cycle, the view of the industry was that demand would continue to 
increase, as China appeared to be a market driver that had considerable potential to provide for 
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exceptional returns in the steelmaking coal industry.  However, as with the first cycle, the 
momentum of supply growth in the steelmaking coal industry has overshot the demand reality of 
the steel industry as world economies have slowed and China has retreated from the market.  This 
has put us in the second phase of oversupply and now the industry must respond quickly to 
remain viable.  There is a fundamental difference this time in that the change from demand 
growth to oversupply has occurred very quickly.  In fact, the rate is approximately eight times 
faster as illustrated figure 2-4. 
Figure 2-4: Rapid Market Response in Second Major Pricing Cycle 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by author, data from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
To go from the highest pricing level to the lowest has taken only 3 years where it had 
taken approximately 25 years in the first cycle.   
The problem this rapid change in pricing has created for the steelmaking coal industry 
and for Teck is that there has not been nearly as much time to adjust strategy to match the market 
conditions.  In fact, there is still debate within the organization as to what the appropriate strategy 
should be because the industry is uncertain whether this is a pause in the demand cycle or the 
beginning of the survival cycle.  If China returns to a higher pace of growth in the economy then 
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demand should improve; however, if China has peaked and will now see slow growth, the 
steelmaking coal industry will have to survive until the next major demand cycle. 
The opportunity for Teck is that the knowledge of high productivity and low cost 
operations still exists in the organization and if we can transfer that knowledge quickly and 
effectively, Teck will be able to compete in what has become a highly competitive market for 
steelmaking coal while still maintaining the capacity to respond to a new growth cycle.  This 
second condition is critical.  We must not be forced to reduce strip ratio and haul distance as the 
only response to lowering operating costs.  I believe that many companies will chose to respond 
this way but those that can retain their reserve capacity will generate significant returns when the 
market rebalances.  Teck must be one of those companies. 
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3: The Analysis – the Steelmaking Coal Industry at this Stage 
of the Market Cycle 
In this chapter, I present a deeper understanding of the steelmaking coal industry and 
develop a technical case for the strategy Teck should be pursuing in this time.  Specifically, I 
explain the criticality of reducing operating costs through productivity improvements and why 
this must be the dominate strategy in this current market. 
3.1 Industry Definition 
3.1.1 Products: 
The coal mining industry is essentially split between thermal coal and metallurgical or 
steelmaking coal.  Thermal coal is the most abundant source of low cost energy in the world and 
is predominately used for power generation.  Steelmaking coal is coal that is used in a blast 
furnace to create the heat and reduction environment to transform iron into steel.  Unlike thermal 
coal, steelmaking coal is concentrated in just a few regions of the world primarily Australia, 
Canada, China, Russia, Mozambique and the United States.  Steelmaking coal has a broad range 
of qualities and characteristics and customers will blend coals from any number of regions and 
sources to optimize the operation of their blast furnaces.  The highest quality steelmaking coals 
are called hard coking coals and are able to form coke which is a main component used in the 
blast furnace.  The lower quality steelmaking coals are called semi-hard, semi-soft and soft 
coking coals and they are blended with the high quality coking coals to optimize the coke from a 
cost and blast furnace efficiency point of view.  The lowest quality coals are not used in coke but 
are pulverized and injected into the blast furnace for their heat content.  All ranges of qualities 
can be used to substitute each other in the process depending on the operating strategies of the 
steel mills.   
3.1.2 Customers: 
The coal mining industry serves the steel making industry that employs blast furnace 
technology to make 2/3 of the world’s steel (the other 1/3 is produced though electric arc 
technology).  Most major economies around the world have steelmaking industries and Teck 
markets coal predominately into Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Europe, and China and to a lesser extent 
into India, Brazil and the United States.  Some customers do not have a source of domestic supply 
of hard coking coal (e.g. Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and India) and must rely on import.  Some 
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customers have strong supply chains internal to their country and can vary the quantity of 
domestic versus import (e.g. China and the United States).  All customers of the steelmaking coal 
industry use coal for the purpose of making steel.   
3.1.3 Competitors: 
Competitors in the steelmaking coal mining industry are essentially any mining operation 
that is producing a coal that can be used in the steelmaking process.  There are essentially two 
types of competitors: 
 “seaborne” which means those mining companies that ship their coal to the 
customer by ocean freight 
 Non-seaborne that would be coals usually mined in the same country the steel is 
produced (e.g. China) or in land locked regions (e.g. Mongolia) 
Teck competes directly and predominately with Australian and US companies in the seaborne 
hard coking coal market as illustrated on figure 3-1.  Teck and other seaborne competitors also 
compete with the internal supply in any given country that has a steelmaking coal industry (e.g. 
China).   
Figure 3-1: Overview of primary competitors in the seaborne steelmaking coal market 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by Michael O'Shaughnessy Director, Business Planning, data 
from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
 -
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
2014 Global Seaborne Steelmaking Coal Production
  
 
13 
3.1.4 Geographic area: 
The geographic area for the steelmaking coal industry is defined by the availability of 
coal reserves.  There are specific regions of the world illustrated in figure 3-2 where hard coking 
coal is present: 
 Australia – largest reserves in the world; supplies greater than 100 million tonnes 
annually to export market 
 Canada – Southeast BC and to a lesser extent Northeast BC and Alberta; supplies 
approximately 30 million tonnes to export 
 United States – supplies approximately 50 million tonnes  
 Mozambique – newly developed region supplying less than 5 million tonnes 
annually but anticipated to grow. 
 China – predominately Shanxi province supplying approximately 600 million 
tonnes to domestic steel industry 
All these regions and the companies operating within the regions compete directly with Teck in 
the steelmaking coal market.   
Figure 3-2: Regions where steelmaking coal is produced and where reserves are present 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by Teck Marketing, data from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
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3.1.5 Summary of Industry Definition: 
The important aspects to the industry definition is that globally, there are relatively few 
suppliers of high quality hard coking coal.  Further, there are relatively few regions of the world 
where high quality hard coking coal exists.  There is an established view that the relatively 
scarcity of reserves and a growing global demand for steel as emerging economies develop has 
and will continue to create opportunities for substantial financial returns for companies that have 
effective operating strategies. 
3.2 Industry Dynamics: 
The steelmaking coal industry has changed significantly from the 60s and 70s to what it 
has become today.  To understand the reasons for those changes and the implications to the 
industry going forward, we have to look at the forces affecting the industry competitiveness.  
Figure 3-3 below outlines a basic overview of Porter’s (augmented) five forces acting on the 
industry today and the subsequent sections will explore in detail. 
Figure 3-3:  Porter's Five Forces Model of Current Steelmaking Coal Industry Competitiveness 
Source: prepared by author, 2015 
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3.2.1 Potential Entrants: 
The steelmaking coal industry has significant barriers to entry and there are a few 
structural reasons for this.  There was a period of consolidation in the mining industry driven by 
low prices/margins that occurred during the 90s and into the 2000s.  The industry in Canada was 
a good example of this as illustrated in figure 3-4. 
Figure 3-4: Consolidation of Canadian steelmaking coal mining industry 
 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by Michael O'Shaughnessy Director, Business Planning, data 
from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
As a result, just a few major producers (as illustrated previously in figure 3-1) now 
dominate the industry.    This gives those producers significant advantage in terms of economies 
of scale and a potential entrant would have difficulty bringing the scale needed to compete in this 
market.   
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Another barrier to entry is the product differentiation that occurs in the steelmaking coal 
industry.  Before a coal is used in the steel making process, it must go through rigorous testing by 
the steel mill that plans to use it.  This is because every steel mill uses a variety of sources and 
qualities of coal to produce a stable and predictable coke for the blast furnace.  The consequences 
of introducing a coal that might disrupt the process in the furnace are so high that the steel mills 
are extremely conservative in their coke design.  Therefore, before a new coal blend is used it 
usually takes years to work through the testing and marketing phases to where it becomes a 
regular product in their blend.  This presents challenges to existing suppliers of steelmaking coal 
and for new entrants with no previous history, the challenges would be even greater. 
Another barrier to entry for the steelmaking coal industry is the access to coal reserves 
and the logistic challenges to reach new reserves.  As previously shown in figure 3-2, there are 
few steelmaking coal regions in the world.  The dominant mining companies already in the 
market control the established regions.  That leaves remote regions like Elga in Russia and Tolgoi 
in Mongolia or less stable regions like Moatize in Mozambique and Maruwai in Indonesia to be 
developed.  In addition to the remote and politically sensitive consideration, coal is a bulk 
commodity and requires significant rail and port infrastructure for the scale of the operations and 
distance to transport.  That infrastructure is well established for the regions of the world currently 
in the market; however, the undeveloped regions require that development to occur before they 
can competitively bring their product to the seaborne market.  
3.2.2 Substitutes: 
The threat of substitution in the steelmaking coal industry is considered low.  Substitution 
can occur in essentially three ways.  The first is the use of lower quality coals to reduce the need 
for the more expensive high quality hard coking coals.  This process is well established in the 
steel industry and is called pulverized coal injection or PCI.  While continued optimization is still 
occurring, there is a limit to how far a steel mill can go with PCI technology.  Evidence suggests 
that in the high pricing period of 2003 to 2013 when the demand for hard coking coal exceeded 
supply, the steel mills responded by advancing this technology as far as they could.  Today, the 
ratios of PCI coal to hard coking coal appear to have reached a maximum in most steel mills. 
The second substitution threat is the actual process of making steel.  Electric arc furnaces 
are used instead of blast furnaces to convert scrap and iron (primarily recycling) through an 
electric process to steel.  These are high cost projects and require low cost electricity inputs to 
compete with blast furnace technology.  While they represent an alternative to traditional 
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technologies for steel making, they have not influenced the demand for steel making coal in a 
material way.   
The third substitution threat is the demand for steel.  Figure 3-5 shows finished steel 
consumption per capita to illustrate the potential growth that will occur in China and India when 
considering the positions of developed economies like Japan, Korea, Germany and the United 
States.  While there is increasing substitution of steel in industries like the automotive industry, 
the overall demand for steel will continue to grow as nations like China and India move to 
industrialize and urbanize.   
Figure 3-5: Finished steel consumption per capita 
Source: bhpbilliton analyst presentation sourced from World Bank, government Statistics for Taiwan, IISI, 
2015 
3.2.3 Supplier Power: 
The steelmaking coal industry like any other mining industry requires significant inputs 
and supplier power is quite high.  The four primary categories considered in this study are labour, 
logistics support (ie. Rail and port infrastructure), major consumables (diesel fuel, tires, etc.), and 
equipment manufactures.   
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Mining equipment has become more efficient as trucks and shovels have gotten larger 
and more productive however this is counter balanced by the existing and future coal reserves 
becoming higher strip ratio and more difficult to mine (i.e. Longer haul distances required to 
move the increasing amounts of waste rock).  Therefore, the need for labour has not diminished 
and combined with the demands from competing industries (like the oil sands in Northern 
Alberta) for skilled labour, the coal mining industry continues to be challenged in this area.  This 
has resulted in relatively high labour rates and is a condition that is expected to continue until a 
transformational technology such as autonomous equipment or in pit crushing/conveying 
becomes a competitive alternative to labour. 
Logistics is a critical component in the supply chain.  There is little competition in the 
rail industry in Canada with only two main competitors and access to the main coal region in 
Southeast BC is effectively only served by Canadian Pacific Railway.  The situation is similar 
with the ports with only three options being available to coal producers.  Many mining companies 
have taken ownership of the logistic chain to mitigate the imbalance in supplier power; however, 
there are significant hurdles to overcome with this strategy.  Teck does own the Neptune port and 
that provides some advantage on the port side but rail service continues to be a constraint that is 
difficult to overcome. 
The mining industry is a very high consumer of energy and therefore, requires significant 
inputs like diesel.  In addition, many components of the equipment used in mining wear like tires, 
truck boxes, buckets, etc. and these consumables have to be constantly replaced.  Fortunately, the 
market for these products is broad enough that the suppliers do not enjoy significant power 
beyond the normal supply/demand influences.  Tires was an exception for a period of time 
however this has come back into balance as the mining industry has slowed down and the mining 
tire industry increased capacity over the last cycle. 
Finally, equipment manufactures supply the major pieces of equipment like trucks and 
shovels to the mining industry.  As with the major consumables, during the period or rapid 
growth in the mining industry from 2003 to 2013, equipment suppliers enjoyed significant power 
however, that has since come back to balance along the same lines as tires did. 
3.2.4 Buyer/Customer Power: 
Buyers in the steelmaking coal industry currently have significant power.  There are a 
few dominant steelmaking companies in the world and they have established very strong 
positions when it comes to what coals they will purchase and from where.  Japanese steel mills 
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have traditionally worked together to strengthen their buying power for raw materials although 
that has weakened in the last decade as they have moved to be more independent.  Because of the 
consolidation in the coal mining industry, the remaining coal producers sell significant volumes 
into just a few primary buyers strengthening the buyers’ position.   
Another strategy that has been employed by the steel producing companies since the 70s 
has been to invest in the coal companies they buy from.  The Japanese Steel Mills were 
instrumental in the late 70s, early 80s in opening up the Northeast Coal region in Canada.  This 
helped secure supply of hard coking coal and lead to an oversupply condition that persisted for 
the next decade.  Posco Corporation in Korea helped open the Greenhills mine in the early 80s 
with a 20% stake; in 2004, they also invested in the Teck Elkview Mine along with the Japanese 
company NSSMC to a combined position of 5%.  Posco also has ownership positions in 
coalmines in Australia.  China Investment Corporation purchased approximately 17.5% of Teck’s 
outstanding Class B subordinate voting shares in 2009 tying China into an indirect ownership 
position for not only steelmaking coal but also copper, zinc and oil.   
The buyers were challenged in the period from 2003 to 2013 due to rapid growth in steel 
production and limited supply of hard coking coal; however, the advantage has shifted back to the 
buyers and until the market comes back into balance, they will enjoy this position.  
3.2.5 Regulators: 
The regulatory system has become much more challenging in the mining industry from 
the perspective of permitting.  Figure 3-6 below gives a sense of the change that has occurred 
over the last three decades. 
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Figure 3-6: Comparison of Permitting Process from the 1970's to Current 
 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by Michael O'Shaughnessy Director, Business Planning, data 
from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
Where operations could move from permitting to production in a relatively short time and 
cost in the 70s, it now requires years and millions of dollars to bring an operation through the 
permitting process even for expansion of existing operations.  This is not only burden on the 
active mining companies but a significant barrier to entry for new companies and regions. 
3.2.6 Complementors: 
Many coal companies, primarily in Australia, also supply iron ore to the same steel mills 
to which they sell their coal.  BHP Billiton has been particularly successful at this strategy.  They 
are able to leverage the combined inputs and shift advantage from one to another depending on 
market cycles.  This is a good strategy in general and Teck has explored the possibility of adding 
iron ore to their portfolio for this purpose many times.   
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3.2.7 Industry Competitors: 
The rivalry among the existing steelmaking coal companies is an interesting one to 
assess.  The industry is highly competitive; however, a few factors indicate there should be a 
lower rivalry than one might expect.  Historically, there were many companies in the steelmaking 
coal business as the industry was being developed in the 60s and 70s.  Then a period of 
consolidation occurred due to a prolonged low pricing (over supply) market (mid 80s to late 90s).  
Many companies went bankrupt and entire regions like the Appalachian region in the United 
States essentially left the market.  Today one company dominates the industry.  The consolidated 
company BHP Billiton (which used to be the separate companies BHP, BMA and Billiton) holds 
almost fifty percent of the market.  The remaining market is divided between 4 or 5 key 
companies.  Teck is the second largest exporter of seaborne hard coking coal behind BHP.  The 
text “Strategy and the Business Landscape” suggests “the more concentrated the industry, the 
more likely that competitors will recognize their mutual interdependence and so will restrain 
their rivalry.”  The text goes on to say, “the presence of one dominant competitor rather than a 
set of equally balanced competitors may less rivalry.”  Both these conditions appear to exist in 
the coal mining industry. 
While the factors above would indicate a lower rivalry, other structural attributes in the 
coal mining industry tend to increase rivalry.  The current coal industry is capital intensive with 
high fixed costs and excess capacity in a slow growth state.  Despite some product differentiation, 
this is leading to high level of rivalry in the market between producers. 
Finally, the barriers to exiting the industry are high and many companies place very high 
strategic value in their positions.  BHP is a good example of this as they produce both 
steelmaking coal and iron ore.  Further, there is evidence to suggest that BHP has been actively 
engaged in over supplying the market for some period of time in an effort to further strengthen 
their strategic position as a producer at the bottom of the cost curve.  Therefore, the current state 
of the coal mining industry is one characterized by very high rivalry among the few existing 
firms. 
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3.3 Gap Analysis 
To determine the best strategy for Teck with the current and future state of the coal 
mining industry, the components to profit will be examined in detail.  Figure 3-7 below will be 
used to guide the process: 
Source: prepared by author, 2015 
3.3.1 Cost of Capital and Capital Invested: 
The cost of capital is affected by supplier power.  In this case, it would be the cost of 
replacing existing equipment for the purpose of lowering operating costs or adding equipment for 
the purpose of increasing production.  Teck invested heavily between 2003 and 2013 in 
equipment and infrastructure and are currently in a good position to avoid excessive capital 
requirements.  Therefore, this is a low impact factor.   
If we consider the rivalry’s position on capital invested, most major companies applied 
the same strategy over the same period Teck did, investing heavily in their coal producing assets.  
As with Teck, there is evidence to suggest that most companies have curtailed capital investment 
as they try to maximize the return on their investments in this current cycle. 
Figure 3-7: Components to Profit 
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3.3.2 Sales Volume: 
The demand for steelmaking coal is still reasonably high despite the over supplied market 
and slower growth in China.  There are limited substitutes and the potential growth in the steel 
industry going forward is still considerable.  Teck is currently able to sell all the coal they can 
produce as evidenced by 2014 being a record sales year.  Unfortunately, the same condition exists 
for most of the coal mining industry so again, there is no strategic advantage for Teck in 
increasing production/sales volume other than maintaining market share and minimizing 
operating costs. 
3.3.3 Price: 
The price for coal is really driven by the dominant company in the industry that being 
BHP.  The market waits until BHP settles a price with their key customers and then that sets the 
stage for the rest of the companies to negotiate for price based on relative qualities of their 
products.  Further, the buyers are currently in a strong position with an over supplied market 
which creates a barrier to entry for new developments (this is illustrated in Figure 10 in the R&E).  
Teck has little influence on pricing despite being the second largest exporter of steelmaking coal 
so there is very limited opportunity for any strategy on pricing.   
3.3.4 Average Cost: 
Average cost is a function of supplier power and rivalry.  From the supplier side, Teck 
has made good progress in the last decade with suppliers.  Teck has long-term contracts with their 
logistics chain, which represents the single largest supplier cost.  Teck also implemented a 
strategic sourcing initiative approximately 5 years ago to negotiate long-term stable pricing 
mechanisms for key inputs like diesel and tires.  Teck continues to look for opportunities to lower 
input costs but we have locked in most contracts with major suppliers leaving limited potential 
for significant gains.     
Summarizing the gap analysis, capital is not a significant factor, sales volumes are at 
capacity, pricing is essentially out of our control and there is not much more we can do with 
suppliers; therefore, the most effective way to increase profit in this environment is to reduce 
operating costs.  Figure 3-8 shows the breakdown of what makes up the average cost to produce 
coal at Teck.   
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Figure 3-8: Breakdown of Cost Components 
 
Source: Teck internal presentation prepared by Michael O'Shaughnessy Director, Business Planning, data 
from Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
  At approximately $27 per metric tonne of product, loading and hauling (i.e. 
Shovel/truck) is by far the most significant profit-determining factor within direct control of the 
company.  Hauling in particular represents $20 per metric tonne and is the single highest 
operating cost associated with an activity.  Unfortunately, haulage costs will continue to increase 
as strip ratios increase and as mines continue to go deeper and subsequently have to haul material 
further away.  In fact, distances have almost doubled since 2004.   
The same conditions exists for the most part among Teck’s rivals in the industry.  One 
strategic advantage Teck has going into this current state of the industry is that historical 
operations that Teck now own competed effectively on operating costs in a much more 
constrained market over a longer period of time in the past.   The period from the early 90s to 
2003 was characterized by relatively low demand in an over supplied market and therefore 
margins for the coal industry were very small.  Success and sometimes survival depended on 
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being able to operate at high productivities and low costs.  Few mines were as low cost and as 
highly productive during this era than the Greenhills and Fording River mines.  This operational 
knowledge still exists today and we have the benchmark performance of the past to access the 
gap.  We also have made considerable progress in this area over the last two years so we have 
some momentum refocusing the operations on this critical factor.   
3.4 Chapter Summary 
The steelmaking coal market is characterized as being in an oversupplied state that could 
last for years.  Based on the industry analysis, Teck faces a highly competitive environment 
where suppliers and particularly buyers hold significant power.  Further, the main competitors in 
this market are reasonably stable leading to high rivalry.  This will continue until the higher cost 
producers, mainly in the United States, begin to leave the market.     
Based on the gap analysis, the dominant strategy for Teck should be to focus on reducing 
its operating costs to maximize profit.  With limited cash being produced from the Teck Coal 
business unit and low capital availability in general (due to investments in other business units), 
focus should be on maximizing the effectiveness of existing assets.  Truck shovel productivity is 
the critical component of average cost in the one profit factor that Teck has the most control.   
To summarize, I believe Teck needs to identify the critical components in its truck shovel 
system that determine productivity; Teck needs to establish the benchmark performance the 
organization should be operating at; and finally, Teck needs to implement a program that releases 
the value of that performance.  Teck will maximize its profit in this current market cycle if their 
strategy is to maximize the productivity of the assets they currently manage. 
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4: The Response - Establishing the Opportunity for Profit 
through Productivity 
In this chapter, I am going to use the benchmarking we do between the operations to 
identify what the potential gap is between what the highest performing operations achieve and 
where the other operations currently perform.   
Many different factors determine truck productivity.   Certainly, the physical 
characteristics of the equipment (e.g. size of truck, engine horsepower, gear ratios, etc.) and the 
physical constraints of the operating environment (e.g. haul distance, grade of ramps, 
intersections, etc.) will set the baseline for how productive the haul trucks can be.  There are 
essentially two configurations in the coal business unit.  The three larger operations employ truck 
fleets consisting of larger class Komatsu 930e and Caterpillar 797 haul trucks.  The three smaller 
operations employ truck fleets consisting of Komatsu 830e and Caterpillar 793 haul trucks.  For 
the purpose of this thesis, I am only focusing on the actual productivity related components of the 
process.  There are many other components involving maintenance and operating efficiency (this 
is a measure of the delays in operating that occur due to scheduled breaks, shift change, blasting, 
shovel moves, etc.).  The areas of focus will be on cycle times both fixed and variable and the 
factors that determine the effectiveness of these times. 
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4.1 Fixed times 
Fixed times are those times the truck is not actively hauling material or returning to the 
shovel empty.  Figure 4-1 below shows the relative fixed times in the larger operations: 
Figure 4-1: Comparative Fixed Times 
Source: Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
The fixed times are made up of the following components: 
 loading - time it takes for shovel to load the truck 
 spot - time it takes the haul truck to position under the shovel 
 queue - time the truck is waiting for the previous truck being loaded to leave the 
loading zone  
 waiting on dump - time the truck is waiting for the dump zone to be cleared for 
entry 
 dump – time it takes the truck to dump its payload at the spoil 
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Greenhills Operation has long set the standard for productivity in the coal business unit 
and has established a set of operating practice that has consistently delivered the lowest fixed 
times.  If we look at the cycle in total, Greenhills has set a benchmark cycle of 4.6 minutes in 
2013.  A dedicated effort at Elkview Operations to address the gap in fixed times has brought 
them to 4.8 minutes (one-month result).  At our largest operations, Fording River, their lowest 
fixed cycle on comparable trucks (Komatsu 930e’s) is 6.2 minutes.  In simple terms, this 
benchmarking illustrates that Greenhills is currently 4.4 % more efficient than Elkview and 35% 
more efficient than Fording River in managing the fixed portion of the haulage cycle. 
4.1.1 Operating Strategy 
To reduce fixed times there are very specific actions each operation much take.  
Greenhills focuses on reducing the queue time of trucks at shovels.  Their operating strategy is to 
have each loading unit slightly under trucked (i.e. not quite enough trucks in a cycle to avoid the 
shovel sometimes waiting for a truck).  By operating this way, there is a sense of urgency around 
the haulage component that drives the crew (supervisors and operators) to focus on everything 
that gets a truck back to a shovel as fast as possible so that the shovel is productive.  Greenhills 
purposefully constrain the number of trucks in the system or increase the loading capacity when 
available to keep the trucks that are operating moving.   
Elkview Operation began operating this way in 2014.  They have reduced their queue 
time on trucks from approximately 2.2 minutes per cycle to as low as 1.0 minute per cycle.  They 
are now operating near the performance level of Greenhills and this strategy has contributed 
significantly to their improvement in truck productivity. 
Fording River has not embraced this strategy historically.  They have operated on a basis 
of maximizing the shovel productivity by “over trucking” the system.  In other words, they 
operate as many trucks as required to make sure the shovel is never waiting for trucks; therefore, 
their queue times are quite high relative to Greenhills and now Elkview.  They feel this is 
required to maximize the volume of material moved in the mine, as shovels are ultimately the 
bottleneck on production.  While that may be a valid strategy in periods of growth, in this current 
operating environment the operation must focus on maximizing the productivity of the highest 
cost component of their overall costs (i.e. haulage).  Year to date 2015, Greenhills is operating at 
$1.98 per bank cubic meter (BCM) combined truck and shovel cost at a comparable haul distance 
of 4.2 km.  Fording River is operating at $2.13 per BCM at a comparable haul distance of 2.7 km.  
Therefore, despite a much longer haul distance at Greenhills; their operating costs are 
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significantly lower on the combined fleet than Fording River.  Comparing overall mining plus 
maintenance costs (i.e. reflective of overall mining system), Greenhills is operating at $3.68 per 
BCM versus Fording River at $4.24 per BCM.  This difference of $0.56 per BCM applied to 
Fording Rivers’ annual material movement of approximately 100 million BCM would yield a 
savings of approximately $50 million if Fording River were to apply the appropriate strategy. 
4.1.2 Operator Skill and Engagement 
Other factors affect the fixed time portion of the cycle like the time it takes the shovel to 
load a truck and the time it takes a truck operator to position at the shovel.  These factors are 
primarily a reflection of the skill of the operator as opposed to the operating philosophy of the 
mine.  Therefore, there is significant opportunity in focusing on the skills of the operators.  The 
average shovel operator at Greenhills takes 1.9 minutes to load a truck.  The average shovel 
operator on a comparable shovel at Elkview takes 2.1 minutes to load a comparable truck and at 
Fording River 2.4 minutes.  There would be significant improvement in operating costs if 
Elkview and Fording River could reduce the time it takes to load a haul truck and this is primarily 
a reflection of the skill of the operator and their engagement.  This requires focusing specifically 
on this aspect of shovel productivity (i.e. load time) as opposed to overall shovel production (i.e. 
how much does the shovel move per operating hour).  The savings is generated by reducing the 
time the truck is non-productive (i.e. not moving).  Shovel operators must be engaged in this 
imperative.  I believe that one of the underlying advantages Greenhills has had with shovel 
operators is that they effectively engaged them.  Shovel operators are taken to their equipment at 
the beginning of the shift by the supervisor.  They were given the supervisor’s channel on the 
radio so that they would be involved in operating decisions during the shift.  These simple 
engagement strategies motivate an operator to perform at their best.   
Similarly, the time it takes an operator of a haul truck to position at the shovel is largely 
determined by the skill of the operator.  This requires training, observation and reinforcement.  
Greenhills focuses considerable attention on ensuring that the truck operators are very skilful in 
this activity.  While it is not as significant a portion of the fixed cycle, it is one that reinforces the 
sense of urgency the organization needs to have around truck productivity. 
4.1.3 Summary of fixed time analysis 
The most significant impact an operation can have on the fixed time of the haulage cycle 
is applying the appropriate operating strategy.  Greenhills is applying a strategy of slightly under 
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trucking their shovels in order to focus the supervisors and operators on maximum efficiency in 
the overall truck cycle and reducing the costs of moving material.  Fording River is applying a 
strategy of over trucking their shovels to maximize the volume of material they move and their 
costs are reflective of this strategy.  Elkview has adjusted their operating strategy along the lines 
of Greenhills and their costs have come down to comparable levels.  Fording River must adjust 
their operating strategy to be competitive in this current market. 
4.2 Variable times 
Variable times are the portion of the cycle where the haul truck is either actively hauling 
material to the spoil or returning to the shovel for the next load.  Figure 4-2 shows the  
Figure 4-2: Comparative Variable Times 
Source: Teck Resources Limited, 2015 
variable times of the cycles combined with the fixed times (non-travel).  The variable times are 
highly dependent on the haul profile the trucks are running (distance and grade) making it more 
difficult to benchmark the operations.  Coal has developed a relatively simple comparative using 
the effective flat haul distance. This is an estimate of the effect of grade on the haul distance and 
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is used to compare one operation to another.  If we take the 2014 result at Elkview of 9.6 minutes 
loaded haul plus 7.0 minutes empty return to at an EFH distance of 5.7 km (one way so double), 
we could represent as an average speed of 41.2 km/hr.  The result at Greenhills in 2014 would be 
7.9 minutes loaded haul plus 5.4 minutes empty return to at an EFH distance of 4.7 km, we could 
represent as an average speed of 42.4 km/hr.  The result at Fording River in 2014 would be 7.3 
minutes loaded haul plus 6.2 minutes empty return to at an EFH distance of 4.0 km, we could 
represent as an average speed of 35.6 km/hr.  Elkview and Greenhills are quite similar but 
Fording River is 16% slower than Greenhills.   
One important limitation in this benchmark is the inaccuracy of the “effective flat haul” 
estimate.  We have long recognized that at best, the indicator approximates relative performance 
at an operation and is not a good comparative to other operations.  Therefore, I am proposing that 
we develop a more accurate model based on the systems we use in Engineering to calculate truck 
productivity for planning purposes.  This model would integrate the actual haul profiles in the 
field with the operating data collected from our truck dispatch system (WENKO) and would 
ultimately produce a much more accurate measure of relative performance between the sites.  
This work was initiated early in 2015 and will be complete by the third quarter.  Once we have an 
effective model for comparing operating performance by site, we will be in a better position to 
gauge the potential value gap. 
While the measure of the variable component to truck productivity is more difficult, the 
focus is clear.  The roads must be designed and maintained to allow the operators to safely 
operate the truck at its maximum capability.  The operators must be trained to know what the safe 
operating envelope of the truck is how to operate in that range.  Finally, the operators must be 
motivated and engaged in the maximizing the speed of the haul trucks.  As outlined in the 
previous section on fixed times, this last component is supported by a strategy of slightly under 
trucking the system.  The operator knows that the shovel will be waiting for them and will be 
motivated to complete their cycle as quickly as possible.   
4.3 Operational characteristics and techniques that maximize truck 
shovel productivity 
There was a time when truck shovel productivity was an integral part of the business.  
Unfortunately, the factors that lead to this success were never well documented.  Instead, the 
techniques were passed from supervisor to supervisor in the field.  Two main factors eventually 
eroded the operations standards.  The first is the high turnover of supervisors and operators 
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caused by expansion in the oil sands in Alberta.  Because the coal patch in South-eastern British 
Columbia is close and because the experience was so high, the oil industry was able to attract 
many of our most talented supervisors and operators with higher compensation packages than we 
could offer.  The other factor was that we were in a period of growth accompanied by high profit 
and as I wrote earlier, productivity was not as important; we could simply buy whatever 
equipment we needed to meet the production requirements.    
One operation that managed to retain the operating standard that they had established 
through the lean years was Greenhills.  This was clearly demonstrated in the sections above on 
fixed and variable times.  They set a standard in the early 90s that has put them consistently at the 
top end of performance relative to their peers.  Previous studies have shown them to be top 
performers globally as well.  They have maintained this position in the industry for over three 
decades despite turnover of hourly and staff employees.  In 2015, Greenhills established a project 
to identify and document the operating practice associated with truck/shovel productivity.  They 
followed a change management process lead by their operating excellence team at site and 
created a “Supervisor’s Book of Standards”.  The methodology and output is a model for all other 
operating sites in Teck to follow.  This body of work has been shared with the other operations 
and must now be integrated into their operating practice.   The practices outlined will address 
many of the technical aspects of maximizing truck productivity and will also have an impact on 
the cultural aspects.  
4.4 Proposed Response to establish best practice across Teck 
Greenhills has established a highly productive system and the work they have done to 
document the practices associated with that system have established a starting point for the 
business unit.  I am proposing that we build off the work that Greenhills has done.  We will put 
together a team comprising of representatives from each business unit in Teck.  Specifically, 
Coal, Red Dog (Zinc), Highland Valley (Copper) and South America (Copper).  The team would 
consist of General Manager, Superintendent, General Foreman and dispatcher levels.  This team 
will develop a process which would include site visits of 3 to 4 days to review operating practice 
and confirm best practice.   
The first deliverable would be a manual of truck/shovel best practices similar to 
Greenhill’s work but more comprehensive and inclusive of other operations’ experience.  This 
manual would outline both the technical aspects of best practice and the cultural aspects.  This 
document will ensure that the critical aspects of truck and shovel productivity are not lost when 
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the market cycle turns to growth again and more importantly, will support the coal business unit’s 
effort to remain competitive in this current market cycle. 
The second deliverable will be a summary of where each site is on the scale for each best 
practice and a list developed by each site of opportunities for 2016 and beyond.  This will ensure 
that the organization is aware of and focusing on those aspects that will yield the greatest benefit.  
The Chief Operating Officer has endorsed this project and I have been assigned to lead 
the effort. 
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5: The Implementation Plan  
We have established that truck shovel productivity is critical to Teck’s profitability in this 
difficult market cycle and we have identified a baseline of operating techniques that can achieve 
the highest level of performance.  Further, I have outlined the project Teck has assigned to me 
through the Chief Operating Officer that will complete the best practice manual and identify the 
gaps in the organization.  Now I will outline an approach for transferring this capability across 
Teck. 
Achieving world-class performance is as much about the culture of the operation as it is 
about the technical capability.  Teck has a considerable amount of experience in culture change 
having implemented a transformational change strategy in safety in 2009.  The approach Teck 
took to creating a culture of safety essentially followed the eight-step framework described by 
Kotter (1995).  I am proposing that we develop a transformation strategy for truck productivity 
using a similar model to what we executed successfully with safety.  In the following sections, I 
will outline the framework for the strategy. 
5.1 Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
This is Kotter’s view on sense of urgency: 
“When is the urgency rate high enough? From what I have seen, the answer is when 
about 75% of a company’s management is honestly convinced that business as usual is totally 
unacceptable. Anything less can produce very serious problems later on in the process.” 
There is no question that Teck recognizes that business as usual is not acceptable.  In 
chapter 2, I demonstrated that the average price for coal today is the lowest it has been since the 
bottom of the previous major cycle.  Further, our operating costs are now much higher than they 
were in the first major cycle due to the increase in regulatory and environmental requirements.  
Our industry is in crisis and many companies will struggle to compete.  The current market 
conditions have provided more than enough incentive to focus on productivity; however, there are 
a number of factors that interfere with the message delivered to the workforce.  The General 
Manager at each operation presents regularly to the crews on the market conditions so that people 
have a full understanding of the state of our industry.  The feeling being that an informed 
workforce is an engaged workforce.  Unfortunately, the unions believe that this is a tactic aimed 
at undermining their bargaining position and they counter by campaigning against the 
information.  Specifically, the unions try to down play the market conditions and point to Teck’s 
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strength in the other business units.  The “back and forth” resembles a political campaign and the 
average employee is left trying to interpret what the real message is.  In the end, the effort to 
engage employees in a productivity imperative is muted.  The following subsections outline the 
steps I think are necessary in building a sense of urgency in the organization. 
5.1.1 Engage the unions 
In this time, we must establish a sense of urgency throughout the business unit that is 
reflective of the state of our industry.  The unions have recognized that the industry is struggling 
but they must be brought to the table on this issue.  We need them to stand with the company as 
we work to engage the workforce.   If we can engage the unions effectively, then our employees 
will get a consistent message and we will be able to create the sense of urgency required 
throughout the business unit to drive productivity strategies.  To do this, we will have to develop 
an engagement strategy with the senior levels of the various union organizations we deal with.  
Further, we will have to deal with them collectively as opposed to keeping the relationship split 
between the locals.  Ultimately, we must create a sense that we are all in this together. 
5.1.2 Identify the common enemy 
Organizations can create a sense of urgency when they establish a view that they are 
under attack.  We know that BHP in Australia is pursuing a strategy of market domination.  I 
demonstrated in chapter 3 that they are by far the largest producer of steelmaking coal (three 
times the second largest producer Teck).  Despite an already dominate position, they are 
oversupplying both the steelmaking coal market and the iron ore market and have publically 
stated that they intend to continue to oversupply the market until higher cost operators are driven 
out.   
Figure 5-1: Quote from Andrew Mackenzie, CEO BHP Billiton 
 
Source: bhpbilliton analyst presentation 2015 
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Clearly, BHP represents a “common enemy” to our organization and we should portray 
this view to our stakeholders and in particular to the unions and to our employees.   
5.1.3 Leverage the history of steelmaking coal 
Building a communications strategy around the history of the industry could also be an 
effective tool in creating a sense of urgency.  As I explored in Chapter 2, we could be in a low 
pricing environment for an extended period and because the transition has occurred so rapidly, it 
is imperative that we adjust to this new environment as quickly as possible.  Many employees 
believe that this is just another cycle that will come and go as they always have; therefore, they 
do not see the urgency with this one.  What they do not realize is that there are really two types of 
cycles.  The minor cycles that regularly occur in the world market as supply/demand responds to 
the established economies and the major cycles that occur when major economic change occurs 
like the emergence of China.  These major cycles have a significant impact on our industry both 
good and bad and employees must understand these implications. 
5.1.4 Summary of “Creating a Sense of Urgency” 
We can create a sense of urgency through an effective communication strategy with our 
employees and this will require cooperation with the unions and the use of resources internally to 
develop the communication package.  The sooner we establish this communication strategy, the 
sooner we can establish the sense of urgency the organization must have in these times.  It is 
imperative that all stakeholders recognize this crisis and that Teck transforms its focus from 
growth to productivity.   
5.2 Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition 
When Teck initiated its culture of safety transformation, there was a team put together to 
lead both the development and execution of the strategy.  That team had the passion, commitment 
and experience to drive the transformation through the necessary stages to where we can say we 
have established a solid foundation for a culture of safety.  Kotter’s view on a powerful guiding 
coalition is: 
“Companies that fail in phase two usually underestimate the difficulties of producing 
change and thus the importance of a powerful guiding coalition. Sometimes they have no history 
of teamwork at the top and therefore undervalue the importance of this type of coalition. 
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Sometimes they expect the team to be led by a staff executive from human resources, quality, or 
strategic planning instead of a key line manager. No matter how capable or dedicated the staff 
head, groups without strong line leadership never achieve the power that is required.” 
We have people in the organization that have that same level of passion and experience 
around productivity.  They need to be brought together to form the guiding coalition this strategy 
will require.  The ideal team will have experts in operating practice, specifically leadership from 
the front line.  This was the lesson we learned with the transformation in safety.  We did not 
engage the front line leaders as effectively as we should have.  The team will also have experts in 
change management, communications, and organizational strategy.  Further, this team will have 
representatives from the workforce and from the unions.  Again, there was a view that the 
transformation strategy for safety would have been more effective if we had of engaged the 
unions in the development of the program.  We can leverage this view to help bring the unions 
into this strategy.  This diverse team will be tasked with advancing the strategy to the workforce 
and they will play an integral role in creating the engagement necessary to be successful. 
5.3 Creating a Vision 
The vision for safety was quite clear and easy to communicate to every employee in 
Teck.  Creating a vision around truck shovel productivity may be a bit more elusive but it is an 
important component in the strategy.  I believe that we need a vision that speaks to the pride our 
operators should have in job they do.  In my experience, the best operators are those that want to 
be the best.  They are competitive and get a lot of job satisfaction from demonstrating their 
capability every day.  The guiding coalition should create and endorse a vision that might look 
something like “we are proud to be the most productive miners in the world”.  The important part 
is that the team put together to drive this strategy be the team that creates the vision.  This will 
create better engagement with both the team and with the employees. 
5.4 Communicating the Vision 
Communicating the vision proved one of the most important stages in the safety 
transformation.  Kotter writes: 
“Communication comes in both words and deeds, and the latter are often the most 
powerful form. Nothing undermines change more than behavior by important individuals that is 
inconsistent with their words.” 
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In safety, we communicated the vision through an experiential model that involved 
sessions with small groups of employees.  I am proposing we do something similar with 
productivity.  The structure of the session would be similar in that we would incorporate the work 
around communicating the sense of urgency at the front end.  Then we would build an 
understanding of our current position and the vision we have of what we can be.  Finally, we 
would engage the group in a process of identifying the steps we need to take to get there.  In 
chapter 4, I outlined much of the work that will inform this stage.  These sessions would be held 
with small groups of operators and supervisors and would be facilitated by senior leadership at 
the operations.  This would represent the “words” part of Kotter’s model. 
The “deeds” will come from the leadership the supervisors provide in the field.  We have 
provide extensive leadership training with our front line supervision over the last three years and 
they should be more than capable in demonstrating behaviours consistent with the messages we 
will provide employees.  In general, the drive for productivity is something that has come 
reasonably easy to the supervisors so this should be a low risk area in the strategy but one that 
must be guided by the coalition. 
5.5 Empowering others to act on the vision 
As Kotter wrote, this stage will involve getting rid of obstacles to change, changing 
systems that undermine the vision and encouraging non-traditional ideas, activities and actions.  
One system that is not in alignment with the vision is our compensation structure.  While we have 
incentive plans based on productivity and profit sharing, these plans are not incorporated into the 
employee contracts.  As a result, the unions do not recognize them and employees do not actively 
engage in them.  They consider the plans outside their control and there is a level of distrust with 
the program given the perception that the company can change at any time. 
I am proposing what has been a very “non-traditional” idea in Teck about hourly 
compensation.  Traditionally both the company and the union have preferred any productivity or 
profit based compensation to be executed outside of contract.  The company prefers this because 
they have more control of the program and do not have negotiate the terms.  The union prefers 
this because philosophically, they do not believe in this form of compensation.  One reason is 
they do not believe hourly employees should be exposed to the variability of company financial 
performance.  I believe another reason is that they are threatened by any strategy that more 
closely aligns employees’ interest with the company’s interest.  They have demonstrated that 
same behaviour with our safety strategies.  It is my opinion that the unions we deal with are still 
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entrenched in a “power based” relationship and struggle with any strategy that they feel may 
erode their power base.  We need to break down these barriers to engagement and align our 
compensation strategy with productivity.  I am proposing that we take the existing productivity 
and profit sharing components that are outside the contract and incorporate them into contract 
during the current rounds of bargaining.  We have an opportunity at this time to take a bold step 
towards aligning hourly employees and their unions with our objectives through a compensation 
strategy that is appropriate in this economic climate and future climates.  There would be two 
parts to the strategy.  The first is a variable pay component that is linked to the operating cash 
margin of the operation they are employed at.  The second is a share distribution that an employee 
receives on a regular basis that is also linked to the operating cash margin.  This strategy 
accomplishes two key goals.  The first is a direct link to productivity through operating margin.  
The second is a link to ownership in the company.   
If we can successfully move down this path, in time, we will be able to build a 
relationship with the unions that is not so based on power but rather on mutual interests. 
5.6 Planning and creating short term wins 
This is an area I believe Teck is already actively engaged in and has very effective 
strategy established.  Key performance metrics are well understood and benchmarked and 
managers are held to account for their site’s performance through regular reviews and 
compensation.  I will not explore this stage in this thesis, as it is not our area of weakness.  I 
believe the opportunity to fully succeed at this stage will come from executing the 
recommendations I have made in the preceding stages.   
5.7 Consolidating improvements and Institutionalizing new 
approaches 
This approach will establish best practice in truck/shovel productivity and it will engage 
employees at all levels of the organization.  I outlined in chapter 4 a process that will establish a 
manual of best practice around truck productivity.  The documented understanding of what drives 
productivity both from a technical perspective and from a cultural perspective will be critical to 
sustaining that effort in the future.  As with safety, the technical knowledge alone is not enough; 
we need to know what motivates people to engage in a productivity imperative.  Further, we need 
to support that engagement through our words and our actions.  Again, as with safety, effective 
leadership will be critical to building this culture.     
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6: Conclusion 
The Teck coal business unit is under extreme pressure to remain competitive in what is 
now the worst down turn the steel making coal industry has experienced since the 1980s.  There 
are few areas left to improve our cost position short of major structural change that could affect 
the long-term viability of the organization.  The one area that represents the greatest single cost 
and therefore, the single greatest opportunity is truck/shovel productivity.  Exceptional 
truck/shovel productivity kept Southeast coal operations competitive in the 1990s.  That focus on 
productivity not only allowed the operations to survive a two-decade downturn but eventually 
lead to exceptional returns when the steelmaking coal market improved. 
It is my belief, that Teck must implement a strategy that leverages historical capability 
and develops a culture of productivity across the operations.  This thesis has outlined both a 
project that has been initiated to identify best practice and the associated gaps as well as a proven 
strategy to create transformation change in the organization.  By combining the technical 
knowledge of truck/shovel productivity with the force of a cultural shift to productivity, we will 
not only remain competitive but will be in a position to deliver exceptional financial returns to 
Teck in the future.  
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